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The “Inherent Vices” of Policy Design: Uncertainty,
Maliciousness, and Noncompliance
Michael Howlett 1,∗ and Ching Leong2
Policy designs must not only “work” in the sense of accomplishing their goals but must also
work in their intended fashion. Most research to date has focused on the former topic and
dwells on the technical aspects of how various tools and instruments could be utilized to
achieve the aims and goals of policymakers. This branch of research tends to underemphasize
the difficulties inherent to policy making including policy contexts that are often highly un-
certain, policymakers who fall short of an idealized version of high capacity, well-intentioned
decisionmakers grappling with relevant public problems, and policy-takers who fail to comply
with government wishes. These “inherent vices” of policy making are factors which contribute
to policy volatility or the risk of policy failure. The paper stresses the need for improved risk
management and mitigation strategies in policy formulation and policy designs to take these
risks into account. It sets out and develops an approach borrowed from product failure man-
agement (in manufacturing) and portfolio management (in finance) to help better assess and
manage these risks.
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1. INTRODUCTION: POLICY DESIGN AND
THE INHERENT PROPENSITY OF
POLICIES TO FAIL
“Inherent Vice — an exclusion found in most property
insurance policies eliminating coverage for loss caused
by a quality in property that causes it to damage or de-
stroy itself.”
International Risk Management Institute Glossary of
Terms
“This glittering mosaic of doubt”.
Thomas Pynchon, Inherent Vice (2009)
There are many problems in policy making that
affect policy outcomes and serve as sources of failure
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or harbingers of success (McConnell, 2010). These
“policy risks” range from unpreparedness in agenda-
setting to nonlearning in policy evaluation and in-
clude poor decision making, policy implementation
as well as problems in policy formulation (Howlett,
2012).
Policy “risk,” however, is larger than this. That is,
even if these tendencies - some already well-observed
and researched in fields such as micro- and behav-
ioral economics (Chapman, Milkman, Rand, Rogers,
& Thaler, 2021; Friedman, 2002; Thaler, 2018) - to-
ward poor preparation and nonlearning are con-
strained, there remain other risks of failure inherent
in policy solutions which should inform policy de-
signs but currently do not do so in a profound enough
way.
Studies of policy design to date instead have
focused almost exclusively on activities which take
place under assumptions of the “right” design con-
ditions. Classical forms of policy analysis are nested
within a tradition of policy design which has a
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purposeful, instrumental character, where knowl-
edge of the impact of specific policy tools is com-
bined with government capacities to identify and im-
plement the most suitable technical means to achieve
a specific aim.
Put another way, this involves thinking about de-
signs and designing where “positive” policy spaces
allow policy making to be driven by knowledge and
good intentions and where high levels of government
legitimacy mean a high likelihood that the resulting
policies will be obeyed by their targets among the
population (Howlett, 2020a; Howlett & Mukherjee,
2017). In such situations of “optimal” design spaces
(Chindarkar, Howlett, & Ramesh, 2017), policy for-
mulation may be all about ensuring best knowledge
or present-day evidence is marshaled toward devel-
oping policies with a high level of confidence that
these will “work.” That is, that they will be effective
in altering target behavior in a manner which com-
plies with government wishes so that policy expecta-
tions are met in the manner anticipated (Peters et al.,
2018).
But these conditions of well-intentioned and
well-informed governments and accommodating pol-
icy targets are often sorely lacking in practice
(Howlett, 2020a, b; Jarvis & LeGrand, 2018). Not
only are government decisions often undertaken in
conditions of high uncertainty (Manski, 2011), but
designs must deal with adverse behavior on the part
of both policymakers and policy-takers (Cox, 2019;
Howlett, 2021; 2020).
Policy designs need to address these "internal"
policy risks head-on. The possibility not just of
uncertainty—a perennial problem highlighted in the
literature on wicked problems, for example (Levin,
Cashore, Bernstein, & Auld, 2012)—but also that
policymakers are often driven by malicious or venal
motivations rather than socially beneficial or disin-
terested ones, and that policy targets have proclivi-
ties toward activities such as gaming, free-ridership,
and rent-seeking rather than complying with gov-
ernment intentions (Howlett, 2020; Taylor, 2021) are
omnipresent concerns that work to undermine policy
effectiveness .
These tendencies must be curbed if even well-
intentioned policies are to achieve their aims, and
policy analysts need a conceptual framework allow-
ing them to better grapple with, and avoid, these
sources of policy volatility (Dudley & Xie, 2020; Feld-
man, 2018; Hoppe, 2017; Viscusi & Gayer, 2018a).
This article builds on research in the areas of risk
and risk management to show how analysts and de-
cisionmakers can deal with these kinds of risks. It
shows how these internal types of risks need to be
better identified and managed if policy designs are to
be effective (Dudley et al., 2020). Toward this end,
insights from other fields such as financial manage-
ment and product manufacturing can be put to good
use in the effort to mitigate these neglected or mis-
understood risks.




In the sense in which it is used in the insur-
ance industry, an “inherent vice” is the quality of any
substance or object which causes it to self-destruct,
whether quickly or slowly (Rodda, 1949). Such vices
are defined in relation to the risk they face—in art
pieces, it could be a function of time or the un-
stable structure of the art piece itself, due to the
paint or materials used; in maritime law it may be
about the perishable nature of live animals, fruits, or
grains or even simply the tendency of ships to sink
(Mirowski, 2010; Rupprecht, 2016). The vice is in-
herent in the nature of the thing itself—the tendency
of a paper-based archive to deteriorate over time as
inks fade, or paper yellows and dries out, or of a
cargo of fruit to rot. Insurers typically exclude these
vices from compensations, meaning carriers and con-
tractors must bear the burden of these risks them-
selves and guard against them. For example, tankers
sailing in reef-filled waters can be designed with
double-hulling and document archives can include
electronic or nonpaper archives. Just as in the case
of maritime conduct or art preservation, understand-
ing the inherent sources of policy failure is impor-
tant to policy design and to the development of mea-
sures to correct, offset or at least mitigate such risks
(Howlett, 2012).
The extent to which these aspects of policy mak-
ing feature in or affect a policy design can be said
to constitute the “volatility” of that policy design or
“mix” (Howlett & del Rio, 2015; Rogge & Reichardt,
2016). The idea of volatility is also present in the fi-
nancial industry, with stock portfolio volatility being
correlated with their risk profiles. Some policy mixes
contain more risks than others and highly volatile
mixes can be contrasted with more stable tools and
mixes in which designs are more likely to approxi-
mate the ideal image often set out in the literature
on the subject.
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Designs featuring volatile portfolios require ad-
ditional efforts to be made to offset that volatility
or hedge against it, meaning the inclusion of more
and different kinds of tools to bolster the primary
set (Bali, Howlett, & Ramesh, 2021). When a pol-
icy requires the use of tools that are often subject
to gaming, fraud, or misrepresentation, for example,
additional procedural tools are required to build in
accountability, monitoring, and auditing functions, so
as to allow such policy mixes to operate effectively in
the face of such vices (Blanc, 2018).
The five key risks listed in Table I are inherent in
the sense that they are built into public policy mak-
ing. These include “unpreparedness” “uncertainty,”
“maliciousness,” “noncompliance,” and “nonlearn-
ing” (Howlett, 2000; Lang, 2016).
While these are all important sources of pol-
icy failure, “unpreparedness” has been the subject
of much work on foresight and issue management
in government (Leigh, 2003; van der Steen & Twist,
2013) while “nonlearning” has long been in the baili-
wick, and sights, of policy evaluation researchers
(Wholey, Hatry, & Newcomer, 2010) and these risks
are realtively well-known and managed against. The
three neglected aspects of inherent policy-making
risk within the policy literature are the uncertainties
which exist around policy problems, malicious de-
cision making, and the effects of poor public com-
pliance with government intentions on policy out-
comes (Howlett & Mukherjee, 2019; 2017a).Students
of other fields such as public administration, compar-
ative government, and specific areas such as tax pol-
icy have dealt with them for some time (Braithwaite,
2003; Scott, 1969; Simon, 1973) but their insights and
strategies have not yet been adequately dealt with in
policy studies.
The status of these last three problems as “inher-
ent vices” in policy making is clear. First, with respect
to uncertainty, as with art pieces, policies can deteri-
orate as a function of incremental changes over time,
such as when the policy tools or instruments which
are combined to create a policy solution fail to de-
liver that solution due to an unanticipated change in
their external environment. Policies can be doomed
from the start if no efforts at all are made to ensure
they accommodate best evidence and practices in
overcoming such uncertainties and dealing effec-
tively with surprises (Howlett, 2019). Decisionmak-
ers knowing they operate within this context may re-
duce uncertainties to a manageable level, quite easily
in some circumstances—such as when they are deal-
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(Parkhurst, 2016) - but not as well in others—such
as novel viruses and pandemics that upset existing
routines and highlight unknown problems and solu-
tions (Capano, Howlett, Jarvis, Ramesh, & Goyal,
2020).
Second, not only are policy solutions and trajec-
tories subject to uncertainties, they are also subject
to abuses and manipulations which can undermine
their ability to resolve problems (Howlett, 2019).
False, biased, incorrect or misleading information
can enter into political discussions and affect pol-
icy deliberations in undesirable ways (Dudley & Xie,
2020a; 2020b; Howlett, 2019; Jones, 2002; Simon,
1967; 1978). And the self-interested behavior of pol-
icymakers, which can lead them to place private gain
ahead of the public good, often interferes with ef-
fective policy making in this way. Evidence of such
malicious and malign policy behavior embodied in
corruption, collusion, clientelism, and other forms of
policy making such as negatively targeting certain
groups or factions (Dahlström, Lindvall, & Roth-
stein, 2012; Legrand & Jarvis, 2014) is a pervasive
trope in the popular media (Cappella & Jamieson,
1996) but often, although not always (Schneider &
Ingram, 2019), ignored by policy analysts and critics.
And third, it is not just policymakers but also pol-
icy takers or “targets” who may not conform with
stereotypes or even more well-founded expectations
about policy compliance (Schneider & Ingram, 2005).
“Targets” may comply with government wishes but
can also evade, alter, or “vote with their feet” in
ways which fail to conform with government inten-
tions (Weaver, 2010, 2014, 2015). This noncompliance
can have significant consequences not only in areas
such as drug addiction or smoking which the feature
stubborn adherence of old habits, but also in much
more mundane circumstances such as tax collection,
tax evasion, and regulatory venue-shopping, among
many others (Braithwaite, 2003; Yackee & Yackee,
2010).
Any of these factors can cause policies to set
off in the wrong direction right at the outset or
“take on water” and gradually deteriorate over
time. That the possibility of such outcomes is “in-
herent” in any policy-making situation, greatly in-
creasing the level of volatility or chances of fail-
ure of any actions taken (Mueller, 2019). This
makes dealing with their risks of central impor-
tance, as it has been in the case of studies of pol-
icy surprises or crises (Boin, Hart, Stern, & Sun-
delius, 2005) and the design of efforts to promote
and deal with the issues surrounding effective pol-
icy evaluation (Pattyn & Bouterse, 2020; Sager,
2018).
Each of these three vices, the lessons from the ex-
isting literature concerning it and the implications of
those findings for policy making is discussed in more
detail below.





Uncertainty is an inherent vice of policy making-
which has been widely studied in diverse disciplines
from psychology to organization theory but only
rarely in a policy context which tends to operate, as
Manski (2011 and 2013) put it, “with incredible cer-
titude.” In the policy world, much of the discussion
around uncertainty has centered on the nature of
what Simon (1973) has termed “ill-structured prob-
lems” or issues in which the nature of policy prob-
lems and solutions are unknown or little known. The
contrast between “wicked” and “tame” problems, for
example, has dominated thinking around uncertainty
in the policy sciences and has influenced both policy
studies and policy making (Churchman, 1967; Head,
2008a; Levin et al., 2012; Rittel & Webber, 1973).
Such unknowns surrounding epistemic quality
of policy solutions, however, are but a part of a
larger group of policy-making problems associated
with the uncertainties policymakers face (Howlett
& Nair, 2017; Morgan & Henrion, 1990). Uncertain-
ties surrounding the choice of policy options, their
consequences, confidence in the quality of available
information, and contested and poorly known or un-
derstood values of multiple stakeholders, including
decisionmakers, leave a great deal of ambiguity con-
cerning what might be the correct action to follow
in many cases, among other things allowing plen-
tiful opportunities for self-interested interventions
(Hansson, 1996; Knight, 1921; van der Sluijs, 2005).
Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) present a clas-
sification of such policy uncertainty focused on
the interaction among actors and knowledge (or
information)-related uncertainty for solving complex
policy problems which is useful in this regard. They
argue that three types of uncertainty exist, which
policies must address. These include:
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(1) Substantive uncertainty that relates to lack of
relevant information related to the nature of
the complex problem, and the different inter-
pretations of information arising from differ-
ent “frames of reference” of the social actors;
(2) Strategic uncertainty that arises due to unpre-
dictability of strategies deployed by different
actors based on their perception of the prob-
lem and strategies likely to be deployed by
other actors, and
(3) Institutional uncertainty that arises owing to
the complexity of interaction of different ac-
tors guided by institutional frameworks that is
rules and procedures of the organizations they
represent.
These uncertainties relate not just to the pres-
ence or absence of policy frames and solutions, but
relate to the issues and risks related to the “value-
ladenness” of policy choices, which includes differ-
ent actor perspectives on the worth and value of the
knowledge and information being utilized for deci-
sion making, and the quality and nature of the pre-
sentation of arguments concerning preferred policy
alternatives and pathways (Head, 2008b; Mathijssen,
Petersen, Besseling, Rahman, & Don, 2008; Maxim
& van der Sluijs, 2011; Webster, 2003). Strategies for
better policy making therefore, need to understand
these risks and policy designs to encompass them.
This involves more than just the need to be able to
design and adopt policies that are agile and flexi-
ble in order to deal with relatively normal “wicked-
ness” or uncertainty (Capano & Woo, 2018); in more
turbulent circumstances, such as where policy ideas
and actors change frequently, and opportunities for
abuse proliferate, policies must be also designed to
withstand active and determined efforts to under-
mine or distort them (Bauer & Knill, 2014; Jordan &
Matt, 2014). This means policies and policy making
require additional and redundant resources and ca-
pabilities which allow them to change course as con-
ditions change, including feedback mechanisms and
procedures for automatic or semiautomatic adjust-
ment (Baumgartner & Jones, 2002; Jacobs & Weaver,
2015; Pierson, 1992; Pierson, 1993).
3.2. Maliciousness
Policy studies have even more rarely dealt with
the second inherent vice, which is related to the
desire of some self-interested parties, from deci-
sionmakers to policy targets, to hijack, distort, or
otherwise reorient public processes toward their own
ends and goals (Habermas, 1974; Jones, 2002; Perl,
Howlett, & Ramesh, 2018).
The existence of this kind of behavior has several
aspects that are policy relevant. These range from the
use of public authority to promote the interests of
ethnic, religious, and other favored groups or specific
sets of “clients” (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, & Nichter,
2014; Goetz, 2007) or to penalize or punish others
(Howlett et al., 2017). And they extend to the mis-
use of policies to enrich or otherwise benefit policy-
makers and administrators themselves (Uribe, 2014),
including manipulating target groups through vote-
buying or other forms of electoral pandering (Bran-
cati, 2014; Manor, 2013).
Most perversions of the public interest such as
corruption, for example, are organizational in nature
and can be managed through a combination of tra-
ditional organizational and regulatory activity pro-
moting accountability and transparency, such as the
creation of anticorruption agencies and the devel-
opment of more effective financial and recruitment
controls. These might include limits on party fund-
ing and careful monitoring of government contract-
ing and procurement activity.
These kinds of vices can often be corrected
through the deployment of a range of policy
instruments—mainly “procedural” tools (Howlett,
2000; 2019)—which can augment or bolster knowl-
edge of policy problems, solutions and the positions
of different policy actors and mitigate these concerns.
While these techniques and strategies are relatively
well-known in the public administration and anti-
corruption fields, the general lessons they have for
policy making have yet to be incorporated into the
mainstream policy sciences (Graycar, 2015; Graycar
& Prenzler, 2013; Phillips & Levasseur, 2004).
3.3. (Non)Compliance
Third, although many implementation studies
have focused on problems related to administra-
tive behaviors which lead to policy failures such as
principle-agent chains (Ellig & Lavoie, 1995) and a
range of “barriers to implementation,” very little of
this work has penetrated into policy studies. These
barriers to implementation, from a lack of person-
nel or financial resources to burdensome historical
practices and legal requirements, slow down or ren-
der implementation ineffective and have received
some treatment in the field (Wu, Ramesh, Howlett, &
Fritzen, 2017). But these studies fail to address other
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significant issues relating to the noncompliance of
target populations with government intentions which
arecritical to policy making and effective policy de-
sign (De Montis, Ledda, & Caschili, 2016; Weaver,
2015) a subject which Weaver (2009) termed “the fi-
nal frontier” of implementation research.
Indeed, overcoming compliance problems is fun-
damental to implementation success. This includes
anticipating and dealing effectively with adverse or
malicious behavior of policy “takers” who fail to
comply or pervert government wishes and frustrate
their intentions (Taylor, 2021). While such behavior
has been an essential component of studies in fields
such as law and accounting (Doig & Johnson, 2001;
Howlett, 2018; Kuhn & Siciliani, 2013), it tends to
be glossed over in studies of public policy (Howlett,
2020; 2021).
The subject of instrument deployment on target
behavior, for example, has until recently been exam-
ined in only a cursory fashion and often under the
burden of economistic assumptions about the moti-
vations and behavior of policy targets (Parker, 2000;
Stover & Brown, 1975). While earlier policy studies
had a more well-rounded notion of the kinds of ac-
tivities undertaken by policymakers toward targets
(Edelman, 1988) and the highly political nature of
the construction of sections of the populace as tar-
gets in the first place (Schneider & Ingram, 1990a,
1990b), these problematic aspects of policy making
and studies of policy compliance were largely lost
in the 1970s and 1980s as more heroic assumptions
about the orderly (and meek) nature of human be-
havior prevailed (Radin, 2000). In this view policy-
takers were often seen as relatively benign or “static”
targets who do not try, or at least do not try very
hard, to evade policies or to profit from them (Braith-
waite, 2003; Howlett, 2019; Marion & Muehlegger,
2007).
The accounts of the actions of bureaucrats and
other implementers commonly found in the policy lit-
erature, for example, often suggested that the only
real issue in policy compliance was one of correctly
calibrating incentives and disincentives to encour-
age policy targets to comply with government aims
when less coercive efforts at moral suasion failed
(Howlett, 2018). However, this not only ignores as-
pects involved in the social and political construc-
tion of targets (Schneider & Ingram 1990a; 1990b),
but also minimizes the complex behaviors that go
into compliance—from levels of trust, to other social
and individual behavioral determinants such as so-
cial norms (Bamberg & Moser, 2007; Howlett, 2019;
Thomas, Milfont, & Gavin., 2016). As many studies
of the subject noted, however, even the most basic ac-
tivities of governing such as collecting taxes involves
a wide range of issues such as the legality and norma-
tive “appropriateness” of government’s levying and
collecting such taxes as well as citizen’s perceptions
of the legitimacy of them doing so (March & Olsen,
2004).
Such activities on the part of policy takers are
key in determining the success of various government
initiatives ranging from tobacco control to bus fare
evasion (Delbosc & Currie, 2016; Kulick, Prieger, &
Kleiman, 2016) and need to be “designed for,” in
the sense that determined noncompliance and gam-
ing should be taken into account, along with many
other such behaviors, such as free-ridership, fraud,
and misrepresentation (Harring, 2016).
Grappling with this key question in the policy sci-
ences therefore allows us to better understand the
conditions of policy success and the kinds of designs
and activities more likely to attain government goals
with minimal effort and expenditure (Feeley, 1970;
Mulford & Etzioni, 1978).
4. TOOLS FOR MITIGATING INHERENT
RISKS OF POLICY MAKING
As the discussion of unpreparedness and non-
learning set out in Table I above has noted, studies
of these kinds of inherent policy risks and attempts
to mitigate them have shown that a variety of pol-
icy tools can be used in this effort. In the case
of preparedness, tools such as the preparation of
emergency plans, the establishment of agencies to
forecast and bring emerging risks to the attention
of government have been used, from Centers for
Disease Control to central intelligence agencies
in the case of national security issues (Lai, 2012).
And many similar kinds of tools have been used to
mandate policy evaluation and attempt to ensure
that policy outcomes are monitored and appraised,
such as regulatory oversight boards and comptroller
generals (Dobell & Zussman, 1981; Dudley, 2020a).
The same is true of the three other inherent vices
discussed in this article: uncertainty, maliciousness,
and noncompliance. In the case of uncertainty pol-
icy volatility varies across time and is not always
manifested in the same way and requires different
means and methods to correct. For example, mixes
of policy tools that rely heavily on markets to pro-
duce desired outcomes—such as private housing pol-
icy or private healthcare—are always vulnerable to
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unpredictable swings in market behavior and are
thus more highly volatile than their public alterna-
tives (Bode, 2006). Such mixes are often highly re-
source intensive and require constant monitoring.
Regulatory or organizationally based alternatives, on
the other hand, may require less day-to-day supervi-
sion in this sense (Hood, 1983, 1986), although other
kinds of uncertainty may figure prominently here,
such as regulatory approaches which lock-in policies
which are not as adaptable, resilient, or responsive as
market-based ones might be.
When it comes to maliciousness, other fields such
as industrial engineering and product design have
also had to deal with issues such as mal- or incom-
petent design and engineering for quick profit or
misuse of a product or service by customers. All of
these fields have developed risk assessment proce-
dures to help identify the extent of errors and abuse
in order to support product management and to se-
lect the kinds of engineering techniques and devel-
opment approaches needed to reduce or, as much as
is possible, to eliminate such activities altogether.
Risk assessment of this type supports the deci-
sionmakers (Altavilla & Garbellini, 2002). This can
be done inductively by looking at past experience
and classifying potential failure modes according to
the severity of their consequences, for example. And
this same logic can be applied to policy making in
the form of, for example, anti-corruption agencies
which can recommend on recruitment, pay, and other
practices intended to remove opportunities and be-
haviors, or drive out corrupt officials and practices
(Graycar, 2015; Graycar & Prenzler, 2013; Quah,
2007).
Finally, when designing for high levels of non-
compliance , the appropriate response of govern-
ments is to create a “compliance regime” involving
a mix of tools and elements (Weaver 2015). A ba-
sic regime of this kind includes such traditional util-
itarian components as providing positive incentives
for compliance, having negative incentives for non-
compliance; and providing prohibitions and require-
ments with punishments attached. But it should also
include less utilitarian ones such as providing infor-
mation about what behavior is compliant, how to
comply and the advantages of compliance; provid-
ing admonitions to comply on moral, self-interested,
or other grounds as well as utilitarian ones related
to individual cost-benefit calculations; providing re-
sources to comply (which may be targeted to those
who would otherwise lack those resources); and ma-
nipulating options and defaults (choice architectures)
without substantially affecting the payoff to individ-
uals of so doing (Weaver, 2015, p. 6)
5. CONCLUSION: DESIGNING FOR RISKS
Risk problems are significant for the study and
practice of policy design due to the implications they
have for how likely it is for a policy to fail and why
(McConnell, 2010). Some of these risks are "inher-
ent" or internal to policy processes and some, like
unpreparedeness and poor learning, have been ad-
dressed by the policy literature. That government in-
tentions may be ill-informed, and state and gover-
nance knowledge bases and capacities limited, that
decisions may not solely be oriented toward the cre-
ation of public value; and that policy targets may in-
dulge in various forms of “misconduct” from fraud to
gamesmanship, undermining government intentions
of whatever kind—all these are only very rarely, if
ever, examined in the policy sciences despite their
prevalence in other fields of scholarly attention and
inquiry (Howlett, 2021 forthcoming; Arestis & Kitro-
milides, 2010; Howlett, 2020).
Much policy design thinking can thus be rightly
criticized for having neglected this realpolitik of un-
certainty, adverse policy making and policy-taking
behavior, and thus the problems these inherent vices
create for policy making and policy designs (Cole-
batch, 2018; Howlett, 2019; Turnbull, 2018).
Solutions to these three vices do exist, of course,
just as they do for unpreparedness and poor policy
evaluation. Walker, Haasnoot, and Kwakkel (2013),
for example, have highlighted four ways (overlapping
to some extent) in which policies can be designed so
as to limit their risks of failure. These include design-
ing to enhance:
(1) Resistance: planning for the worst possible
case or future situation.
(2) Resilience: making sure that the system can re-
cover quickly whatever happens in the future.
(3) Static robustness: aiming at reducing vulner-
ability in the largest possible range of condi-
tions.
(4) Dynamic robustness (or flexibility): planning
to change policies over time, in case conditions
change.
Solutions can also be envisioned by looking at
policies as a portfolio of risks, analogous to what is
done with investment portfolios in the case of the
financial industry, where a portfolio logic is used to
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deal with the uncertainties involved in market fore-
casting, and packages are tailored to specific risk
preferences of consumers and investors (Archer &
Ghasemzadeh, 1999; Project Management Institute,
2008; McFarlan, 1981; Olsson, 2008; Pellegrinelli,
1997; Sanchez, Robert, Bourgault, & Pellerin, 2009;
Teller & Alexander, 2013). Preparing alternative pol-
icy options for decision-makers in this way, as in the
financial sector, can make risks more transparent and
allow policy-makers some choice in establishing the
level of risk they are willing to face in adopting spe-
cific courses of action.
Dealing more seriously with problems around
policy volatility and inherent vices in this way is nec-
essary if policy design is to achieve its purpose of
creating better and more effective policies. As set
out in Table I, specific lessons can be drawn about
how each of these risks can be managed. This can
be done through a variety of means—from institu-
tionalizing foresight agencies to deal with the risk of
surprises affecting government agendas, to improv-
ing and mainstreaming evaluation and measurement
activities to reduce the risk of poor or nonlearning
occurring in policy evaluation (Dudley, 2020; Dudley
& Xie, 2020b).
Although the policy sciences lag behind in this
area at present, much can be learned from stud-
ies in other fields that have had to deal more often
and more directly with the reasons why the artifacts
they produce often fail. The new focus on behavior
which has already been noted in recent works on the
“behavioral turn” in the policy sciences (Leong and
Howlett, 2020), for example, holds out much hope in
this regard.
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